Eddie Schwartz – CISO, RSA and Uri Rivner – Head of cyber strategy, Biocatch
Talk started with some discussion around general Trojan attacks against companies, rather than long term high tech APTs, with the tagline; If these are random attacks.. We’re screwed!
Worth checking the pitch, but there was a series of examples from the RSA lab in Israel of usernames and passwords and other data that Trojans had sent to C&C servers in Russia. These included banks, space agencies, science agencies, nuclear material handling companies etc.
So what to the controllers of these Trojans do with the data? Remember these are random attacks collecting whatever personal data they can get, not specific targeted attacks. A common example is to sell the data, you can find examples of the criminals on message boards etc. offering banking, government and military credentials for sale.
Moving onto examples of specifically targeted attacks and APTs.. Examples of targeted attacks include; Ghostnet, Aurora, Night Dragon, Nitro and Shady RAT. These have attacked everything from large private companies, to critical infrastructures to the UN. All of the given examples had one thing in common – Social Engineering. Every one used Spear Phishing as their entry vector.
From this I think you need to consider – Do you still think security awareness training shouldn’t be high on your organisations to-do list?
The talk went onto discuss Stuxnet and Duqu, along with their similarities and differences, largely what was captured in my last post. The interesting observation here was their likely different plaes in the attack process. Stuxnet was at the end and the actual attack, Duqu likely much earlier in the process as it was primarily for information gathering.
A whole lot more targeted malware examples were given including Jimmy, Munch, Snack, Headache etc. Feel free to look these up if you want to do some further research.
In light of this evidence it is clear we need a new security doctrine. You will get hacked despite your hard work, if it has not yet happened, it will.. Learn from the event, an honest evaluation of faults and gaps should result in implements.
Things to consider as part of this new doctrine;
– Resist – Threat resistant virtualisation, Zero day defences
– Detect – Malware traces, Big data analytics, behavioural profiling
– Investigate – Threat analysis, Forensics and reverse engineering
– Cyber Intelligence – Threat and Adversary intelligence
Cyber Intelligence was covered in some more specific details around how we can improve this;
– External visibility – Industry / sector working groups, Government, trusted friends and colleges, vendor intelligence;
- Can this information be quickly accessed? For speed should be in machine readable format, but use whatever works!
– Internal visibility – Do you have visibility in every place it it needed, HTTP, email, DNS, sensitive data etc.
- Do you have the tools in place to make use of and analyse all of these disparate data sources
– Can you identify when commands like NET.. and schedulers etc. are being used?
– Do you have visibility of data exfiltration, scripts running, PowerShell, WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) etc?
– Do you have the long term log management and correlation in place to put all the pieces of these attacks together?
Summary recommendations and call to action..
– Assume you are breached on a daily basis and focus on adversaries, TTPs and their targets
– Develop architecture and tools for internal and external intelligence for real-time and post-facto visibility into threats
– Understand current state of malware, attack trends, scenarios, and communications
– Adjust security team skills and incident management work flow
– Learn from this and repeat the cycle..
Next steps (call to action!);
– Evaluate your defence posture against APTs, and take the advice from the rest of this post
– Evaluate your exposure to random intrusions (e.g. data stealing Trojans), and take the advice from the rest of this post
Useful presentation from a technical and security team standpoint, but completely missed the human and security awareness training aspect – despite highlighting that all the example APTs used spear phishing to get in the door. I’d recommend following all the advice of this talk and then adding a solid security awareness program for all employees and really embedding this into the company philosophy / culture.