RSA Conference Europe 2012 – They’re inside… Now what?

Eddie Schwartz – CISO, RSA and Uri Rivner – Head of cyber strategy, Biocatch

Talk started with some discussion around general Trojan attacks against companies, rather than long term high tech APTs, with the tagline; If these are random attacks.. We’re screwed!

Worth checking the pitch, but there was a series of examples from the RSA lab in Israel of usernames and passwords and other data that Trojans had sent to C&C servers in Russia.  These included banks, space agencies, science agencies, nuclear material handling companies etc.

So what to the controllers of these Trojans do with the data?  Remember these are random attacks collecting whatever personal data they can get, not specific targeted attacks.  A common example is to sell the data, you can find examples of the criminals on message boards etc. offering banking, government and military credentials for sale.

Moving onto examples of specifically targeted attacks and APTs..  Examples of targeted attacks include; Ghostnet, Aurora, Night Dragon, Nitro and Shady RAT.  These have attacked everything from large private companies, to critical infrastructures to the UN.  All of the given examples had one thing in common – Social Engineering.  Every one used Spear Phishing as their entry vector.

From this I think you need to consider – Do you still think security awareness training shouldn’t be high on your organisations to-do list?

The talk went onto discuss Stuxnet and Duqu, along with their similarities and differences, largely what was captured in my last post.  The interesting observation here was their likely different plaes in the attack process.  Stuxnet was at the end and the actual attack, Duqu likely much earlier in the process as it was primarily for information gathering.

A whole lot more targeted malware examples were given including Jimmy, Munch, Snack, Headache etc.  Feel free to look these up if you want to do some further research.

A very recent example of a targeted attach that was only discovered in July of this year is VOHO.  This campaign was heavily targeted on Geopolitical and defence targets in Boston, Washington and New York.  It was a multistage campaign heavily reliant on Javascript.  While focused on specific target types the attack was very broad, hitting over 32000 unique hosts and successfully infections nearly 4000.  This is actually a very good success rate, with the campaign no doubt considered a success by those instigating it..

In light of this evidence it is clear we need a new security doctrine.  You will get hacked despite your hard work, if it has not yet happened, it will..  Learn from the event, an honest evaluation of faults and gaps should result in implements.

Things to consider as part of this new doctrine;

–          Resist – Threat resistant virtualisation, Zero day defences

–          Detect – Malware traces, Big data analytics, behavioural profiling

–          Investigate – Threat analysis, Forensics and reverse engineering

–          Cyber Intelligence – Threat and Adversary intelligence

Cyber Intelligence was covered in some more specific details around how we can improve this;

–          External visibility – Industry / sector working groups, Government, trusted friends and colleges, vendor intelligence;

  • Can this information be quickly accessed?  For speed should be in machine readable format, but use whatever works!

–          Internal visibility – Do you have visibility in every place it it needed, HTTP, email, DNS, sensitive data etc.

  • Do you have the tools in place to make use of and analyse all of these disparate data sources

–          Can you identify when commands like NET.. and schedulers etc. are being used?

–          Do you have visibility of data exfiltration, scripts running, PowerShell, WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) etc?

–          Do you have the long term log management and correlation in place to put all the pieces of these attacks together?

Summary recommendations and call to action..

–          Assume you are breached on a daily basis and focus on adversaries, TTPs and their targets

–          Develop architecture and tools for internal and external intelligence for real-time and post-facto visibility into threats

–          Understand current state of malware, attack trends, scenarios, and communications

–          Adjust security team skills and incident management work flow

–          Learn from this and repeat the cycle..

Next steps (call to action!);

–          Evaluate your defence posture against APTs, and take the advice from the rest of this post

–          Evaluate your exposure to random intrusions (e.g. data stealing Trojans), and take the advice from the rest of this post

Useful presentation from a technical and security team standpoint, but completely missed the human and security awareness training aspect – despite highlighting that all the example APTs used spear phishing to get in the door.  I’d recommend following all the advice of this talk and then adding a solid security awareness program for all employees and really embedding this into the company philosophy / culture.

K

RSA Conference Europe 2012 – The Science Lab: Live RAT Dissection

Great talk and demo from Uri Fleyder and Uri Rivner on VNC based Man In The Browser (MITB) attack.  The talk started with some general observations of the current state of the malware market, then went into the demo.

Whys rats are spreading in the underground – We are moving to much more advanced underground supply chain.  This follows neatly from the Keynote talks around the ever increasing availability of advanced tools.

A great example is the Citadel Trojan kit.  Developed from Zeus – this was sold then source code leaked..  Citadel is a live ongoing project, with many add ons from GUI based Trojan development and deployment.  Citadel only costs $2399 + modules, yearly membership of the Citadel online ‘aap store’ costs as little as $125 per year.  Modules can be bought for low amounts of money such as

Log parser for $295

Automatic iFramer of FTP accounts from logs for $1000

Recent releases of Citadel include multiple enhancements such as injects directly from the control panel.

This highlights just how easy it is to get access to advanced malware creation kits, and how low the cost of entry currently is.

Demonstration of Man In The Browser (MITB) attack showing user accessing a compromised site.  The browser appeared to crash, then the user re-opened it and carried on working.  The user then accessed their bank and received a security warning saying that some checks were being performed to updated their machines security, these may take a few minutes, please do not close or refresh the browser window.

At the same time the criminal received a text telling him a new machine had been compromised.  He then logged into his Zeus control account to see what the machine was and which bot had infected it.

The next step is that the bank site asks the customer to input their credentials including pin + key code to access their account.  This is achieved by inserting java script into the banking page on the user’s browser.

From the malicious users machine the criminal has used VNC to log into the users machine and from their into the users bank account.  The user inputting their pin and code details will enable the criminal to perform a transaction on their account such as a funds transfer.  The criminal does this in the background while the user is waiting for the initial security checks, once the criminal gets to the point where they are stuck and need the users 2-factor credentials they then update the message to request these details as mentioned in the last paragraph.

The criminal is sent the username and password from the initial login;

https://twitter.com/ufleyder/status/255643717027913729/photo/1

Then the 2-factor code from the second message;

https://twitter.com/ufleyder/status/255646235078307840/photo/1

The criminal then sends a sorry site down for maintenance screen to the user again by injecting it via JavaScript to the bank page the user thinks they are accessing.  This is to try and allay any fears or concerns so the user (victim) does not immediately suspect something malicious has occurred.

This works because the user has gone to the banking page they trust, and as they typed the url or went to their saved favourite rather than clicked a link somewhere they assume all is well.

Another advantage for the attacker of this type of attack is that they appear to come from the users machine as they are going through a VNC (remote administration) connection to the users machine.  This circumvents and checks the bank (or whatever site) has in place to be more concerned about connections or transactions initiated from unknown devices.

According to European banks something like 30% of all fraud no comes from same device attacks like this.

Summary;

–          VNC embedded in Zeus clones is a dramatic escalation of the threat level.  Make sure your defences are ready!

–          Continuous monitoring is more resilient – e.g. user behaviour analysis, how fast is the user clicking and entering data, what is their pattern of clicks etc.

–          Don’t rely on identifying the device

–          Consider randomising, encrypting DOM space

–          Zeus and other clones are polymorphic, normal scans are not effective

–          Make sure your machines are getting all relevant patches

–          We used to rely on something you know, this is broken, now we rely on something you have, this is crumbling.. What next, something you are linked with behavioural analysis?

A lot to think about here..

K